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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DEANE. PARK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY, a
eorporation; METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF OREM, a public corporation, and OREM CITY, a municipal corporation,
Def end ants and Respondents.

Case No.
11345

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to quiet title to the appellant's water
and ditch rights, evidenced by two shares of stock in Alta
Ditch and Canal Company, a mutual irrigation company,
against such company and against the Metropolitan
\Yater Distriet of Orem and Orem City, claimants of the
use of such water under lease and exchange agreements.
Orem City counterclaimed for payment for water delivered to the appellant.
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pISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court dismissed the amended complaint,
holding that the appellant's only right against the Alta
Ditch and Canal Company was as owner of two shares
of st·ock, that the agreements between such Company
and Metropolitan Water District of Orem were valid
and that the appellant's water right was subject thereto.
The court also held that the appellant had no right to use
or maintain his pre.sent connection with the Orem City
pipeline. Orem City's counterclaim for payment for
water delivered to the appellant friom N ov·ember 1, 1962
to October 1, 1967 was dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to reverse that part of the judgment of the trial court denying to him a decree quieting
his title to his proportionate share of the water of Alta
Spring, and denying his right to carry his water in the
Orem City pipeline. He seeks affirmance of that part of
the judgment dismissing Orem City's counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Alta Ditch and Canal Company, a corporation, will
be hereinafter ref erred to as ''Alta'' and the respondents
Metropolitan Water District of Orem and Orem City will
be hereinafter collectively ref erred to as ''Orem.'' A
defunct corporation which preceded Alta will be referred
to as "Old Alta".
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Old Alta was incorporated in 1893 for the purpose of
pooling the water rights of its stockholders for more
convenient and efficient distribution of water. It was a
typical, mutual irrigation type company. (Ex. 26). Its
Charter expir·ed on May 16, 1943. (Ex. 26) . .A nnw ~"1·
poration having the same name and same articles of
incorporation was organized in 1946. (Ex. 7). The appellant bought certificate No. 224 for two shares of stock
in Old Alta from one Robert B. Calder in 1947. (Tr. 71).
Calder's certificate was transferred from the certificate
of Verena C. Crandall, No. 213, dated in 1945. (Ex. 13).
This certificate was issued from certificate No. 202, dated
November 4, 1943. (Ex. 13). Certificate No. 202 was
issued from Certificate No. 195 which was elated February 20, 1943. (Ex. 13).
In 1950, two years after the appellant purchased his
certificate of stock, a decree was entered in a suit entitled,
"Orem City vs. Alta Ditch and Canal Co., et al., filed in
the District Court of Utah County which involved the
question as to whether Orem City, a stockholder in Old
Alta, was entitled to its proportionate share of the water
of the same Alta Spring as that involved in this case.
'l1he entire file is in evidence. (Ex. 3). It will be noted
that Orem City won its case and the court quieted its
title to its pro rata share of the water. (Ex. 3, File #2).
In the decree dated March 24, 1950, appears the following significant provision:
'' . . . 8. That the new Alta Ditch and Canal
Company has acquired no title in, or to, the said
Alta ditch or water and has no right to control or
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liquidate said property or rights beyond that
which may be accorded to it by common consent
of the persons interested, the right to regulate
and administer the property for the purposes of
liquidation remaining with the old corporation
until its winding up in accordance "''1th the provision of this decree ... '' Exhibit 3.
It is clear that in 1950, two years after the appellant
purchased hi,s stock, Alta (the new Alta referred to in
the decree). had ... "acquired no title in or to, the said
Alta ditch •or water .... and had no rig,ht to control or
liquidate its property . . . bey ond that which may be
accorded to it by common consent of the persons interested.... " (Emphasis added).
I
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In the meantime, before the entry of the decree quoted
from above the appellant met with the City Council of
Orem City on October 12, 1949, and made arrangements
to have bis proportionate part of the water of Alta
Spring delivered to him through the Orem City 14-inch
pipeline which carries the City'.s share of Alta Spring
water from the spring, a distance ·of several miles to the
City where it is used for municipal purposes. The minutes of the October 12, 1949 meeting are as follows:
''Dean E. Park was present to ask the Council
to consider him tapping the 14-inch pipeline as
proposed from the basin to the diversion unit just
above the storage tank and running a line to his
bowl for irrigation purposes. Mr. Park owns two
shares of Alta Water and wished to have the
City include his water with theirs and use it in
regular turns each week, taking out the equivalent of two shares from the pipeline through a
4

meter and if more water is used then he would be
charged for it. He was told that it wa·s felt that
the project could be worked out by a State Engineer and the City Engineer and that it would
prohably be agreeable v.rith the Council.''
Three days after the meeting of October 12, 1949,
(Ex. 12) ·work on the facility to connect the appellant's
\rnter line with the Orem line began (Tr. 66, 67). Orem
City Engineer Beckman at the direction of the Orem
City Council designed the works and supervised construction (Tr. 11, 12, 29). From 1949 to the date of filing
this suit the appellant diverted his share of Alta Spring
water through the Orem City pipeline to his system constructed at an expense exceeding $24,000.00 (Tr. 64, 83).
At the time of the construction of the appellant's
eonnection facilities mentioned above, the appellant was
at the site with James Ferguson, president of Alta and
Jlerrill Crandall and Howard Ferguson, directors. (Tr.
67, 68) .•Tames Ferguson testified that he recalled the
meeting at the connection site, testified that he had known
all about the appellant's pipeline and the fact that he
had been getting Alta Spring water since 1949. (Tr. 167,
168, 171).
The appellant's pipeline was replaced with a larger
diameter line in 1958 and a meter was installed. (Tr. 66,
74, 75). The record discloses no other changes in the
system during the seventeen-year period from 1949 to
1966. Between 1949 and 1966 Alta made no objection to
the diversion of appellant's water through the pipeline.
(Tr. 76). He received a constant flow. (Tr. 151, 152).
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The minutes of the City Council indicate no Orem
transaction with appellant from October 12, 1949 to
October 3, 1960. In a meeting on the last mentioned date
the appellant's water connection was mentioned and it
was "tabled for further research." (Ex. 12, p. 2). The
minutes for May 8, 1961, show that the appellant appeared at the City Council meeting and reported his
arrangement with the City for the connection. (Ex. 12,
pp. 2, 3). On July 17, 1961, the City Council directed its
attorney, Mr. Wentz, to draw up a formal contract with
appellant. (Ex. 12, p. 3).
Mr. Wentz was called as a witness by the appellant.
He produced a draft of an agreement which was offered
and received in evidence. (Ex. 27). It provides that the
appellant would transfer his water right and pipeline
system to Orem City, and that upon such transfer he
would take from the Orem City pipeline the quantity of
water represented by his two shares of stock. If he diverted any water in excess of his entitlement he would
pay for it. Mr. Wentz testified that the draft of contract
was presented to the appellant but he refused it. (Tr.
179). The appellant denied that he had ever seen it. (Tr.
184).
The record is uncontradicted that Orem City did not
bill the appellant for water from 1949 to August 1, 1966,
(except for one bill in 1961 for $7.50 about which there
is a controversy (Tr. 73, 74, 241, 242). Frank Ferguson,
Orem City employee, testified that he had read the appellant's water meter regularly from 1960 to 1967. (Tr.
257-259)
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M cier readings on the appellant's pipeline since 1962
are in evidence (Ex. 38) and records of the yield of Alta
Spring are in evidence. (Ex. 11) Mr. Beckman, former
City Engineer of Orem testified that based on the records
in eviden('e he caleulateu that during the period of
measurement the appellant had diverted through his
pipeline 18,024,759 gallons less than his entitlement from
Alta Spring. (Tr. 276-278). This excess went down the
pipeline to the Orem City system. (Tr. 276)

In 1956 Orem and Alta entered into a written agreement for the leasing to Orem of all of Alta's Alta Spring
water. (Ex. 4).
In 1958 Alta and Orem entered into an agreement by
the terms of which Alta agreed to exchange its part of
Alta Spring's summer water for Deer Creek Reservoir
water plus a cash consideration. (Ex. 5). This was renewed in 1966. (Ex. 6).
In 1964 an additional agreement was made by the
two parties reciting that "Orem and Alta are owners as
tenants in common of Alta Springs, ditch, pipeline, right
of use of waters and works, Orem being the owner of
34.8% and Alta being the owner of 65.18% of the same
with Orem also owning 41 shares of Alta Stock in said
65.18%. '' The parties agreed to jointly expend some
$~l2,000.00 to cover Alta Spring. (Ex. 31).
The summer water exchange agreement (Ex. 5) expireu by its terms on November 1, 1965. W'lien the irrigation season commenced in 1966 there was no exchange
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agreement in effect and the stockholders in Alta received
their pro-rata share of the spring water in turns. The
water master, Cecil Ferguson, delivered appellant's
water represented by his two shares into his pipeline
to give him cullinary water. (Tr. 295, 296). The exchange
agreement was later renewed. (Ex. 6).
The appellant, in his amended complaint, alleges
ownership of two shares of stock in Alta which entitle
him to that proportion of the water of Alta Spring which
his share bears to the total number of shares outstanding
and to a right to carry his share of the water through
Alta's ditches, pipelines and other facilities. He further
alleges the construction of his pipeline at great expense
to connect to the Orem City line, the connection arrangement with Orem City and the other ultimate facts summarized above. (R. 49-53). Alta answered denying the
allegations relating to the water rights of the appellant
and counterclaimed for a decree declaring the validity of
the lease and exchange agreements mentioned above.
(R. 69-72). Orem denied that the appellant was entitled
to carry water in the Orem City pipeline or bad any
rights therein and counterclaimed for back water payments and injunctive relief. (R. 60-68)
The trial court made a judgment dismissing the appellant's amended complaint, declaring the validity of
Alta's lease and exchange agreements and holding that
the appellant's rights against Alta were only ,as the owner
of two shares of stock. (R. 96-97). A's to Orem, the court
found in effect that the appellant has no right to use or
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mai11 tain his connection with the Orem City pipeline or
to convey water through the said pipeline or its other
diversion works or conveyance facilities. The court denied to Orem City the right to rec·over the reasonable
value of water delivered to appellant during the period
November 1, 1962 to October 1, 1967. (R. 97). This appeal
is from the judgment dismissing the amended complaint.
Orem City has appealed from the adverse ruling on the
counterclaim. (R. 107)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The appellant i's the owner of a right to use his

proportionate share of the water of Alta Spring.
2. The holder of stock in a mutual vrnter company is
entitled to receive his proportionate share of the water
and the majority ha,s no right over his objection to sell,
exchange or ·otherwise deprive him of it.
3. Alta did not, by the water lease and exchange
agreement, have authority to deprive the appellant of his
right to use Alta Spring water without his consent.

4. Alta is estopped from interfering with the appellant's water supply.
5. The appellant has a valid and enforceable agreement with Orem for the use of its pipeline and facilities
for the carriage of his Alta Spring water.

9

ARGUMENT

1. THE APPELLANT IS THE U\VNER OF A
RIGHT TO USE HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OI•'
THE WATER OF ALTA SPRING.
The appellant contended at the trial that he has been
'
since acquiring two shares of stock in Old Alta, the
owner of his proportionate share of that corporation's
water rights and facilities. Old Alta organized in 1893
was a typical mutual irrigation company. The water
rights of its stockholders were pooled for more convenient distribution of water. The factual situation became
complicated by the expiration of the Charter of Old Alta
in 1943 and the organization of Alta with the same name
and articles of incorporation in 1946. See Exhibits 7 and
26.
The appellant bought Certificate No. 224 from one
Robert B. Calder in 1948. Calder's certificate was transferred in 1947 from the certificate ·of Verena C. Crandall,
No. 213, dated in 1945. This certificate was issued from
Certificate No. 202 dated November 4, 1943. (Ex. 13). It
is clear from the evidence that the appellant's certificate
represents an interest in the defunct corporation; although it was not purchased until after the old corporate
charter expired and the new corporation was organized.
In 1950, two years after the appellant purchased his
certificate, a decree was entered in a suit entitled," Orem
City v. Alta Ditch and Canal Co., No. 15460' ',filed in the
District Court of Utah County, which involved tl1e ques-
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tion as to whether Orem City, a stockholder in the defunct AJta Ditch Co., was entitled to its proportionate
share of the water of the same Alta Spring as is now
inYolved in this case. The eutire file is in evidence. (Ex.
:1). It will be noted that Orem City won its case and the
court quieted its title to its pro rata share of the water.
Tn the decree dated March 24, 1950, appears the followiug significant provision:
'' ... 8. That the new Alta Ditch and Canal Company has acquired no title in, or to, the said Alta
ditch or water and has no right to control or
liquidate said property or rights beyond that
which may be accorded to it by common consent
of the persons interested, the right to regulate
and administer the pr·operty for the purposes of
liquidation remaining with the old corporation
until its ·winding up in accordanc~e with the provision of this decree ... '' Exhibit 3.

It is clear that in 1950, two years after the appellant
had purchased his stock, the new Alta had ''acquired no
title in, or to, the said Alta ditch or water" and had no
iight to control or liquidate its property "beyond that
which may be accorded to it by common consent of the
persons interested .... " (Emphasis added).
The testimony of James Ferguson is uncontradicted
that s·ince 1950 no transfer of water rights has been
made from the old Alta to the new Alta. (Tr. 172). It is
also uncontradicted that appellant has mar1e no conveyance of water rights in Alta since the entry of the decree

in 1950. (Tr. 72)
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Thus, the appellant has two bases for his claim to
ownership of his pro rata share of Alta Spring water,
both based upon ownership of Certificate No. 224, (1) his
position as successor to a stockholder in the old corporation, and (2) his position as a shareholder in a mutual
irrigation company.
2. THE HOLDER OF STOCK IN A MUTUAL
WATER COMP ANY ]S ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE \V ATER,
AND THE MAJORITY HAS NO RIGHT OVER HIS
OBJECTION TO SELL, EXCHANGE, OR OTHER1VISE DEPRIVE HIM OF IT.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held in a fong line
of cases, going back nearly 60 years, that a mutual water
company is not like an ordinary business corporation.
A mutual company is essentially a corporate water master. It is created normally to manage, distribute and
control the water. -While it may take legal title to the
water right, the equitable title remains in the stockholders. Thus, stock in a mutual company is not treated as
personal property, but it is frequently held to be appurtenant to land. The stockholders are tenants in common
of the water, and it was never contemplated that the
eorporation would have the authority to sell the water
right or otherwise deprive any other stockholder of his
proportionate share of the water. At the outset, we direct
the court's attention to the corporate purpose, as stated
in the articles. In thi,s regard the articles of the old Alta
Ditch and the articles of the new Alta Ditch are the same,
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and this corporate pur]Jose clearly constitutes each of
these eompanics a tn:ic:\l \Ve:-;1<>111 nwtual water rompany. The artides provide:
"That the object, business m1<l 1mrsuit of said
Corporation is, and sli<ill eonii11ue to be, to carry
on and conduct the business of making working
and maintainiug ditehes aw1 canals and waterways, and particularly the ''AHa Ditch and
Canal'' for the c-mT~ i11g mid comlucting of water
for the irrigation of la11(Li, farms, orchards and
gardens, for the use of and propelling ·of maehinery fm mill and rninii1:~· purposes, and any,
every and all other nsei'nl and la1vful purposes
for which sueh ditches, cauals, or reservoirs and
water can or may be used.'' (See Article IV, Ex.
26, and Article III gx. 7)
There are many cases from the Utah Supreme Court
which make the distinction noted ahove. ln East River
Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah 14-9, 128 P. 2cl '277 (1942), the
court noted that the only legal basis npou which stock
could he is·sued in a nm tual company was by signing the
articles and presumptively upon a showing that such
person was the o\vner of a 1va te t' right which he could
exchang·e for the stock. I11 that case the co;:npany had
originally issued Certificate No. 7, representing 7 shares
of stock. Later a pnrchaser of tlwt stot:k, without surrendering it to the compally, induced tbe company to
is.sue iu lieu thereof Certiftrnte :t\o . ."J(i. 'Clrns, two separate eertificates were ontstanc1inb: each representing
the same seven share::; of ·stock. Ultimately the entire 14
shares were deli·,'ered to a bm1k as security for a loan.
The water rompany theH 1ook tlle position that 7 shares
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had been erroneously issued, au<l were void. In upholding
the irrigation company's position the Utah Supreme
Court held that the mutual irrigation company had only
the power and authority to manage, control and distribute the water; that the company could not issue a certificate of stock without receiving a water right in exchange therefor. Said the court:
The corporation was a loose sort of a mutual
agreement for the unifed management and distribution ·of the water to the owners. The limited
and restrictive words for the purpose of ''control, management and distribution'' is not a conveyance ,separating a water right appurtenant to
land from the land and does not vest the title or
right of use in the corporation within the provisi,ons ·of Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Seotion
100-1-10 and 18e'Ction 100-1-11. The company has
power or authorHy only to manage, control and
distribute the water. The water right was never
severed from the land and is still appurtenant
thereto. An examination of the articles of agreement to determine what a stock certificate represented would, either for inve1stment or loan
purposes disclose what the certificate actually represented. There is no power of assessment in the
original article. The annual expenses were to be
submitted to the stockholders and when the proportion of each one was de·termined he was not to
be permittted to use water until his pr,o rata share
of the expenses were paid.
The only legal basis upon which stock could be
issued in the company was by signing the articles
of incorporation and agreeing to the method of
distribution and control and presumptively upo11
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a showing that such person was the owner of a
u'ater right in the Provo River as sho·wn by the
decree ref erred to in the articles of incorporation.
The stock certificates constitute a declaration
of the proportion of the water to be distributed
to the persons to whom they were originally issued upon which regulations for distribution were
based. (Emphasis added)
See also Continental National Bank v. Minersville
ResPrvoir and Irrigation Co., 73 Utah 243, 273 P. 502
(1928) where the court, after noting the particular articles of incorporation, held that the only method by which
anyone could acquire stock in the oompany was to exchange a water right for the stock, and that an over issue
of stock not in consideration for a water right was void.
In Smithfield lVest Bendt Irrigation Co. v. Union Central Life Insu-rooce Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 P. 2d 866
(1943), the court expres·sly said that a mutual company
cannot sell any of the water without the consent of the
stockholders or for non-payment of dues. This case invulved only the water reaching the end of the canal. The
court, in recognizing the aforegoing principle said:
The waters of a mutual irrigation company belong to the users, the company being merely a
distributing and apportioning trustee. Such was
the Logan Northern Company. The water controlled by it may be used by any shareholders,
subject only to the regulation thereof by the company for the benefit of the shareholders so none
shall be deprived of his rights by the others.
The company cannot sell any of the water with-
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out the co11se11t of the stockholders wr for nonpayment of dues if the articles of 'incorporation
make the stock liable for such costs and expenses.
Likewise the company c..:annot permit the water to
be lost by 11011-use tl1ereof as long as any shareholder desires to and is in a position to use the
water. \Vate1· m1distrilmted may be used by any
stockholder in a position to use it. The shareholders are in effect ovvners in common of the
·waters with certain limitations as between one
another cgoYerning the use thereof. Each may•
therefore use any water not being used by any
other shareholder, as is the case with other owners in common. Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 318, 95
P. 732, 98 P. 1083, 102 P. 728; Stephens v. Beall,
22 Wall 329, 22 L. Ed. 786; Bu.rbank v. Crooker,
7 Gray Mass., 158, 66 Am. Dec. 470; Tuttle v.
Campbell, 74 Mich. G52, 42 N. \Y. 384, 16 Am. St.
Rep. 652: Mullins v. Bidtf Hardware Co., 25 Mont.
G25, 65 P. 1004, 87 Am. St. Rep. 430; Bergere v.
Chaves, 14 N. M. 352, 9::3 P. 762, 51 A. L. R., N. S.,
50, affirmed in Cllau:s v. Bc1·gere, 231 U. S. 482,
34 S. Ct. 144, 58 L. Ed. 325.
~

In Genofo v. Santaquin City, 9G Utah 88, 80 P. 2d 930
(1938), the court said that a stockholr1er in a mutual company has "a right to demand and receive his aliquot
share of the water being distributed by the company in
the proportion that his stock bears to all stock.'' The
court said that, "Water rights arc pooled in a mutual
company for the convenience of operation and more
efficient distribution, and perhaps for more convenient
transfer. But the stock certifirate is not like the stock
certificate in a compan~· operated. for profit. It is really
a certificate showing an undi,·ic1crl part ownership in a
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"eriain water supply. It embraces the right to call for
::;uch undivided part according to the method of distribution.''
The court recently quoted with approval from this
holding in St. George City v. Kirkland, et al, 17 Utah 2d
292, 409 P. 2d 970 (1966).
In Salt Lake City v. East Jordwn Irrigation Co., 40
LJtah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911), the Supreme Court applied
these principles in a damage suit. Salt Lake City had
condemned the right to enlarge the existing canal of the
irrigation companies. The court was concerned with
whether or not the irrigation company could collect for
the damages suffered by the individual stockholders
while the water was out of the canal. The Supreme Court
held that the company could not make such a recovery,
and in so holding said :
·while the water users who are also stockholders of the respondent undoubtedly will be
bound by any judgment that may be rendered in
this proceeding so far as it in any way affects the
rights of the respondent as a corporate entity and
as it may affect the stockholders as such, yet the
stockholders cannot be bound in case appellant
invades what is purely the privab right of the
stockholder, and in that way damages him in a
matter which does not affect the corporation. The
corporation does not represent the stockholder in
his private rights or affairs, and hence cannot bind
him, although it seeks to do so in an action ·or proceeding to which he is not a party. Let us apply the
foregoing principle to this case. Assuming that
A. as a stockholder of respondent, and a water
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user under the canal, has 500 head of cattle whi<'li
must be watered daily; tLat in entering upon the
canal and enlarging it appellant so interferes
with the diversion of the water from the canal
that A. cannot obtain any water therefrom, and
is compelled to obtain water for his cattle elsewhere for the space of a week or ten days, or until
appellant has again placed all of the diverting
appliances in place, so that A. may again obtain
water as before, and that A., by reason of having
to obtain water elsewhere or for any other reas'Oll
directly attributable to appellant's interference
with the diversion of water, is damaged to the extent of $500, assuming now that respondent receives these damages in this proceeding and turns
the same into its treasury - how will A. obtain
recompense for his injuries? Again may it not be,
indeed, would it not be almost impos·sible to be
otherwise than, that some stockholders as water
users are damaged more than others, and that the
damages, if any, may not all be controlled or governed by the amount of stock any one of them
holds in the corporation~ If, therefore, the respondent is permitted to prove and recover any
special damages that any individual stockholder
may suffer, then such stockholders as may not
have suffered any damages may nevertheless he
benefited by receiving out of the treasury of
respondent a portion of the damages that are
suffered by the other stockholders. In other words,
the corporation is permitted to recover for the
benefit of all the stockholders that which only a
few may have suffered, and where no two may
have suffered to the same extent. For the foregoing reasons we think the rule that a judgment
ap.·ainst the corporation binds the stockholder only
in matters which directly affect the corporation
1

1
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in its rights and liabilities is manifestly sound.
Upon both the questions involved in special findings 2 and 3, therefore, we think the evidence
should be confined to matters which may affect
and damage the corporation in its rights, since
such special damages as will be •suffered by the
individual stockholders in their individual rights
cannot be adjusted in this proceeding, since the
proceeding is intended to fix and adjudicate the
damages respondent will suffer, and not those
that others may sustain who are not parties to
the proceeding. It would be unjust to require
appellant to pay to respondent what belongs to
another, and especially in a case where the loss
can only be ascertained when the rights of such
other ar·e interfered with. We are clearly of the
opinion, therefore, that the trial court proceeded
upon a wrong theory with regard to the measure
of damages.
This principle was recently considered in GwwnisonFayette Canal Co. v. Gunnison Irrigation Co., Case No.
11209, decided December 5, 1968, and not yet reported.
The court, by a three-two decision, permitted the irrigation company to collect damages for loss of water, but
the majority in so holding stated that the suit was not
brought for damage to crops, but rather for the loss of
water, and that if the plaintiff corporation recovered for
the value of the water, it would hold the proceeds of the
judgment in trust for its stockholders.
In re. Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748
(1924) quoted with approval from an Idaho case Ireton
v. Idaho Irr. Co., 30 Idaho 310, 164 Pac. 687) as follows:
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"It is contended by appellant that the shares
of stock in the operating company are personal
property, and that the water right passed by
assignment of them, and did not become subject
to the mortgage on the land. vVhile shares of stock
in an ordinary corporation, organized for profit,
are personal property (section 2747, Rev. Codes;
State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho, 784, and cases therein
cited on page 802, 156 Pac. 1141), and while this
court has held shares in an irrigation company to
be personal property (Watson v. Molden, 10
Idaho, 570, 79 Pac. 503 ), the fact must not be lost
sight of that a water right is, as heretofore shown,
real estate, and that in case of a mutual irrigation company, not organized for profit, but for
the convenience of its members in the management of the irrigation system and in the distribution to them of water for use upon their lands in
proportion to their respective interests, ownership of shares of stock in the corporation is but
incidental to ownership of a water right. Such
shares are muniments of title to the water right,
are inseparable from it, and ownership of them
passes with the title which they evidence. In re
Thomas' Estate, 147 Cal. 236, 81 Pac. 539; Berg
v. Yakima Valley Canal Co., 83 Wash. 451, 145
Pac. 619, L. R. A. 1915D, 292."

The court also quoted with approval from a California case Woodstone M. & T. Co. v. Durnsmore C. W.
Co., 47 Cal. App. 72, 190 Pac. 213, as follows:
"V\There the owners of water rights appurtenant to their several tracts of land formed a
mutnal corporation and transferred their water
rigMs to the corporation in exchange for stock
representing the right to water, the water right
remained appurtenant to the land notwithstand-
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ing the formal change in ownership and passed
to a mortgagee of the land and appurtenant water
rights as against a subsequent execution buyer
of the ·stock which still stood on the cornorate
books in the name of the mortgagor."
L

The court noted a Utah case (George v. Rob·ison, 23
Utah 79, 63 Pac. 819, 1901) and said that its decision was
based largely upon the argument that shares of stock
representing the water rights in question were personal
property, and said:
''But we think the rule is not absolute, and
should not apply to shares of stock in an irrigation company which is not organized for profit
but for the convenience of owners of water rights
in the regulation and distribution of the water to
which they are entitled. This distinction was not
considered in the opinion of the court and there
were other controlling factors in the case, for
which reason the general rule there expressed
should be modified, when applied to a case like the
one at bar.''
In Arnold v. 0. & R. Association, 64 Utah 534, 231
P. 622, (1924) the court, in commenting on the rights of
stockholders in a mutual company, said:
Counsel, however, overlooks the all-important
fact that the members of the defendant, as water
users, stand on precisely the same footing, and
that each one is entitled to his proportion or pro
rata share ·of water that is fit for irrigation and
domestic and culinary use. There are no primary
or secondary rights with regard to those water
users. If counsel's contention should prevail, the
members receiving water out of the Huntington

21

canal and the North ditch would ·obtain the use of
water which is fit for the purposes aforesaid,
while those farther down the stream would have
to be content with water that is totally unfit for
use. The lower water users ·would thus be deprived of the use of water. Only a part of defendant's members would thus be ·served with water
responding to their needs. If, therefore, there is
seepage water, which, through no fault of the
lower water users, is made unfit for use, and for
that reason must be permitted to run to waste,
each one of the defendant's members must bear
his proportionate share of the lo·ss. No other conclusion is permissible or defensible.
In the case of Baird v. Upper Canal and Irrigation
Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060 (1927), a petition for a writ
of mandamus was filed to compel a corporation to permit
a stockholder to connect her pipeline to the corporation
water system. The district court granted the writ of
mandamus and the water company appealed. The corporation refused to permit the shareholder to make the
desired connection because the stockholder proposed to
take the water from the area irrigated by the corporation canal system.

It was held that where a stockholder sought to compel
a corporation to permit her to connect her pipeline to
the corporation water system that in absence of any arrangement to the contrary the water in the mutual
corporation must be delivered to the stockholder in proportion to the stock owned and that the corporation could
not refuse to deliver water merely because the stockholder desired to use the water in an area outside of the
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area embraced within the irrigation system of the water
corporation. The Board of Directors owes the duty to
distribute to each stockholder his proper proportion of
water available for distribution.
The case.s cited above clearly support the appellant's
µosition that he is the owner, by virtue of his stock ownership of his aliquot share of the water of Alta Spring.
The trial court erred in holding, in effect, that the appellant did not own such share of spring water, but that
all the water belonged to Alta, and could be dispo.sed of
by that company as it Baw fit. That the trial court erred
in so holding is clear, because there has never been a
conveyance of title of the water right from the old Alta
Ditch fo the new Alta Ditch, (See the testimony of James
J<,erguson Tr. 172) and because even assuming such oonveyance, both companies were mutual irrigation companies. They were only corporate water masters with
the power to manage and distribute the water. The company had no such right as would permit it to exchange
the appellant '·s share of the pure spring water for water
not suited for domestic use.
3. ALTA DID NOT, BY THE WATER LEASE
AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DEPRIVE THE APPELLANT OF HIS
RIGHT TO USE ALTA SPRING WATER WITHOUT
HIS CONSENT.
The appellant having established a water right in
Alta Spring, it is clear that such right could not be contracted away without his consent.
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The exchange agreements between Alta and Orem
covering both the summer water and the \vinter water
are in evidence. Exhibits 4, 5 and G. The obvious purpose of the exchange was to make available to Orem
the superior quality spring water. (Tr. 222, 223) The
testimony of Engineer Brown, \vitness for the defendants, is that Alta Spring water as now gathered, transported and treated meets public health standards, and
that water pumped out of the end of the Alta ditch is
contaminated. (Tr. 226).
The testimony of Cecil Ferguson, water master and
witness for Alta, is definite that the only water not involved in the exchange with Orem is the Orem City
water and the water represented by the appellant's two
shares of stock. (Tr. 295, 296). The appellant testified
that since 1949, without interruption, he has diverted
water out of the Orem pipeline for use on his property
which includes domestic use in his home, livestock water
and water for irrigation sprinkling. By practice over
nearly 20 years, the appellant's water has been effectually
severed from the remainder of the Alta water, and the
appellant has enjoyed use of his water through a separate system for a purpose different from the irrigation
purpose which Deer Creek water will just as well serve.
(Tr. 76, 83, 151, 152).
There is no evidence that the appellant consented to
the water lease and exchange agreements or in any
manner ratified them. The checks representing the dividends which were sent to him have been promptly re-
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turned to Alta with the correct comment that they did
not belong to him. (Tr. 95, 96). The appellant has always
recei,·ed hiH water without question, and in fact, the
water master, Cecil Ferguson, during an interim period
between the expiration of the old agreement and its renewal, arranged for the interruption of irrigation turns
to assure a steady supply of water for the appellant
through the Orem City pipeline. (Tr. 295, 296). Mr. Ferguson testified that it was the practice to measure the
Alta Spring water at the head house. At times when the
water was diverted at the head house, the Orem water
and the appellant's water represented by his two shares
went down the Orem City pipeline. Orem got all of the
appellant's water which was not diverted to his property. (Tr. 296).
Absent consent of the appellant, Alta could not contrad away the water right of the appellant in Alta
Spring which had by common consent and practice been
given a separate status. This is the case whether this
right of the appellant is a part of the water belonging
to Old Alta, or a proportionate part of the water being
(listributed by common consent by the new Alta.
4. ALTA ]S ESTOPPED FROM INTERFERING
\\'ITH THE APPELLANT'S -WATER SUPPLY.
There is no conflict in the evidence as to the facts
and circumstances under which the appellant's pipeline
system was construeted. It is alleged in the Amended
Complaint in paragraph 9 that the defendants and each
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of them have, since 1949, acquiesced in the diversion of
Alta Spring water by the appellant and have stood by
while he expended a large sum of money for his water
system. (R. 51). This allegation was denied. (R. 62, 71).
The appellant testified that in 1949 he was at the site.
while the diversion from the Orem line was being constructed in the company of Jim Ferguson, Merrill Crandall and Howard Ferguson. (Tr. 67, 68). Mr. Ferguson
was then and still is the president of Alta. (Tr. 163). He
was also president of Old Alta. (Tr. 171). Howard Ferguson, who was also a director, made a deal to rent 1%
shares of the appellant's water with the understanding
that the other % share would run down the pipeline to
supply the appellant's ·stockwatering and irrigation
needs. (Tr. 64, 69). The arrangement lasted for seven
years and then a similar deal was made with appellant's
'''1.tness, Richard P. Anderson, for one year. (1957). (Tr.
65, 156).
Mr. James Ferguson, Alta president, recalled the
meeting at the diversion site, testified that he had known
all about the appellant'.s pipeline and the fact that he
had been getting Alta Spring water since 1949. (Tr. 167,
169). There could be no better proof of knowledge, acquiescence, and expenditure of large sums of money in
reliance on Alta's .special treatment of the appellant's
water entitlements than appears in the record in this
case. The rule of equitable estoppel must be applied to
prevent manifest injustice.
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That knowledge of an officer of a corporation is attributed to a corporation is settled law. rrhis rule applies
even though the knowledge is not communicated to the
corporation.
19 C.J.S. p. 613, section 1078.
Pacific Digest, Key 482.
Strohecker v. Mutual Bldg.
Nev. 350, 34 P.2d 1076.

ct

Loa;n Ass'n., 55

Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg. Co.,
89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099.

The rule on equitable estoppel is stated as follows:
"A person who, with knowledge of the facts
and of his rights acquiesces in or ratifies an act
or transaction is estopped to repudiate such act
or transaction as against one who is misled to his
prejudice." 31 C.J.S., page 589, section 114.
The rule is stated in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2, page 1680, section 818 as
follows:
''Acquiescence consisting of mere silence may
also operate as a true estoppel in equity to preclude a party from asserting legal title and rights
of property, real or personal, or rights of contract. The requisites of such estoppel have been
described. A fraudulent intention to deceive or
mislead is not essential. All instances of this
class, in equity, rest upon the principle: If one
maintain silence when in conscience he ought to
speak, equity will debar him from speaking when
in conscience he ought to remain silent. A most
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important application includes all eases \\·here a11
owner of property, A, stands by and knowingh
permits another person, B, to deal with the pro1;erty as though it were his, or as though he were
rightfully dealing with it, without interposing
any objection, as by expending money upon it,
making improvements, erecting buildings, and
the like ... "
'11his species of estoppel applies to corporations in
their dealings with third persons.

Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence ,Vol. 2, page
1681, section 819.
5. THE APPELLANT HAS A VALID AND EN.
FORCEABLE AGREEMENT WITH OREM FOR
THE USE OF ITS PIPELINE AND FACILITIES
FOR THE CARRIAGE OF HIS ALTA SPRING
\YATER.
Orem City and Metropolitan \Yater District of Orem
were joined as defendants because they were parties to
the water lease and exchange agreement affecting Alta
Spring water. It will be noted that those agreements
purport to lease and exchange all of the water distributed
by Alita. Or·em contends that this included the appellant's
water and that, therefore, the continued use of the
water by him was illegal and he should pay for it. Orem
City was also joined as a defendant because it has re·
pudiated an agreement with the appellant for the use of
the City pipeline.
The history of the transaction between the appellant
and Orem City is disclosed largely by the minutes of the
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City Council of Orem City for the period from August
30, rn48, to the date of the filing of the suit. The minutes of the meeting of October 12, 1949, arc very significant because both Orem City and the appellant operated
under them for some seventeen years before the present
wit was filed. They read:
''Dean E. Park was present to ask the Council
to consider him tapping the 14-inch pipe line as
proposed from the basin to the diversion unit just
above the storage tank and running a line to his
bowl for irrigation purposes. Mr. -Park owns two
shares of Alta Water and wished to have the City
include his water with theirs and use it in regular
turns each week, taking out the equivalent of two·
shares from the pipe line through a meter and if
more water is used then he would be charged for
it. He was told that it was felt that the project
could be worked out by a State Engineer and the
City Engineer and that it would probably be
agreeable with the Council.''
Three days after the meeting of October 12, work on
construction of the diversion began with City Engineer
Beckman acting as the designer of the diversion works
and the supervisor of construction. (Tr. 66, 67). From
1949 to October 3, 1960, I find no minutes pertinent to
the case. On October 3, 1960, the appellant's water connection was mentioned and ''tabled for further research." (Ex. 12, p. 2). On May 8, 1961, the minute.s show
that the appellant appeared at the City Council meeting
and reported the arrangement between him and the
City, which report is substantially the same as bis testimony in this case. (Ex. 12, pp. 2, 3). On July 17, 1961,

the City Council decided to have a contract dra'.vn up between the appellant and Orem City and directed its attorney to proceed. (Ex. 12, p. 3). The minutes of November 4, 1963, disclose that Attorney Wentz was directed tu
bring to the Council a copy of an agreement he had sent
to the appellant for signing. (Ex. 12).
Mr. Wentz was called by the appellant as a witness
and he produced a draft of an agreement which was
offered and received in evidence, which very significantly
provided that the appellant would transfer to the City
his water right and pipeline and would then be entitled
to take the quantity of water represented by his two
shares of Alta water out of the Orem line. He would pay
for any quantity s·o taken in excess of the water entitlement of the 2 shares. (Ex. 27). It will be noted that this
was the substance of the minute of October 12, 1949,
quoted above.
Another significant fact confirming the arrangement
is that Orem did not bill the appellant for water from
1949 to August 1, 1966 (except for ·one bill for $7.50
about which there is a conflict of testimony), (Tr. 73, 74),
although Frank Fergu·son testified he had read the appellant's water meter regularly from 1960 to 1967. (Tr.
257-259). If the appellant was just an ordinary water
customer, why did the City fail to send a bill? The obvious answer is that both parties were operating under
the arrangement reflected in the minutes.
The water was metered after 1958, and meter readings of the water taken by the appellant since 1962 and
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re0ords of measurements of the yield of Alta :Spring are
in eYidence. (Ex. 11, 38, 39).
Mr. Beckman, former City Engineer of Orem City,
made cakula tions based on the measurements in the record and testified that during the. period of measurement,
the appellant diverted 18,024,757 gallons less than his
entitlement from Alta Spring. (Tr. 276-278). This excess
water went down the pipeline into the Orem City system.
(Tr. 276). Based on City rates in evidence, the value of
this water was substantial.

CONCLUSION
It must be concluded:
1. The appellant owned a proportionate part of the
water of. Alta Spring based on his ownership of two
shares of stock in Old Alta.

2. The appellant's wa:ter was not included in the
water exchange between Orem and Alta, because he did
not consent to lease or to exchange his part of the Alta
Spring water.
3. The appellant spent large sums of money to connect to the Orem pipeline and to carry his water to the
plaee of use ·with the knowledge and acquiescence of Alta.
Alta is now estopped to deny the severance of appellant's
\Yater from the ·other ·water of the company.
4. Orem City and the appellant have an agreement
1eli1 cted in the minutes that the appellant could carry
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his Alta Spring water in the Orem City pipeline and
would pay for water in excess of his entitlement as a
shareholder in Alta.
5. Orem City has had the use of more than 18,000,000
gallons of appellant's water since 1962.
6. The agreement for use of the Orem pipeline is
valid and is in full force and effect.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court denying appellant the relief prayed for in his
amended complaint should be reversed.
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